The Khmer Rouge and the Cold War

The Cold War (1946-1991) polarised the entire world. A contest of two ideologies played a central role, as liberal democracy was pitted against Marxism-Leninism.[1] When the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia on 17 April 1975, Cambodia became more involved in the divisive nature of the Cold War. ‘Along with Stalinist and Maoist models, an underlying theme of the political worldview of the Pol Pot group was a concern for national and racial grandiosity.’[2] Pol Pot’s megalomania and utopian ideas aspired to recreate the agricultural success and global independence of the Angkorian era: considered one of the greatest past civilisations.[3]Instead, Cambodia became a prison camp state. ‘Its 8 million prisoners served most of their time in solitary confinement. 1.7 million inmates were worked, starved, or beaten to death.’[4] Throughout the ongoing genocide committed against the Cambodian people, the Khmer Rouge were supported by governments across the world. Many groups in Cambodia, including a variety of minorities (Muslim Cham, Buddhists, Chinese and Vietnamese, to name a few), were more or less eliminated during Pol Pot’s reign. Acknowledging the Cold War and the influence it had over international response to the Cambodian genocide is crucial to understanding one of the worst tragedies of the previous century.[5]

This essay will discuss various international responses to the Cambodian genocide, whilst considering how the Cold War influenced these decisions. Firstly, this essay will look at military and financial involvement in the region. Chinese financial support to the Khmer Rouge will be discussed, alongside the ongoing role of the USA. Secondly, the essay will progress by analysing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, and the role this played on the response to the genocide.[6] Finally, this essay will explore legal responses, including international tribunals and indictments. Marks’ argument that the Khmer Rouge’s culpability for committing the genocide needs to be compared to the international reactions and the actions taken to seek justice for the victims, is central.[7] It will be argued that the Cold War had a multifaceted effect on the international response to the Cambodian genocide.

The Cold War heavily dictated the US’ effort to ‘stem the spread of international Communism, a goal that increasingly served as the basis of American policy throughout the world.’[8] Through preventing the spread of Communism, military and financial involvement were essential. Although there was little political or economic interest in Southeast Asian territories like Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, the US considered them symbolically important to prevent Communist victory.[9] For this reason, the US became involved in waging a full-scale war against Soviet-backed communist forces in North Vietnam in 1965. The Vietnam war is deemed a US failure.[10] Nevertheless, it is for this reason it influenced the international response to the Cambodian genocide.

As the war in Vietnam heated up, neighbouring Cambodia inevitably became a factor.’[11] The border territory was repeatedly targeted because it was seen to host Vietcong sanctuaries and was used to get supplies through and inside the war-torn region.[12] Moreover, the Ho Chi Minh trail - which had recognisable strategic importance - went through Cambodia.[13] This trail was often part of ‘a massive bombing campaign’ led by US forces.[14] Numerous historians corroborate Kiernan’s point that, as the US escalated the war in Vietnam, ‘Cambodia had little hope of remaining an oasis of peace.’[15] President Nixon’s orders to release ‘extensive B-52 bombing raids of border areas of Cambodia’ are evidence of this.[16] Throughout the Vietnam war, multiple air attacks were inflicted on Cambodian border villages, ‘killing over 100,000 peasants and driving many survivors into the ranks of the Khmer Rouge’.[17] As the war intensified, Cambodian hostility towards US forces escalated, thus prompting the breakdown of relations between the two countries. US aggression drove support for the rise of the communist party in Cambodia: the Khmer Rouge. Eventually, when Pol Pot seized power, US-Cambodian relations had collapsed and Operation Homecoming – the US’ withdrawal of troops from Vietnam - was well underway. Ultimately, the US failed to prevent the spread of Communism to Southeast Asia.

Once in power, the Khmer Rouge began a destructive border conflict with their neighbours.[18] These attacks were possible because Cambodia was ‘one of the single greatest beneficiaries of Cold War competition’; receiving financial aid from China and the US.[19] The Khmer Rouge - despite the genocide - contained the influence of communism in Vietnam, and therefore was used to balance off Vietnam.[20] There was considerable interest for China and the USA alike ‘in blocking Soviet power and preventing Vietnamese hegemony in the region’.[21] Moreover, it is equally probable that the US was reluctant to challenge the Khmer Rouge regime considering their previous failures in the region. ‘For such geopolitical reasons, while the Cambodian genocide progressed, Washington, Beijing and Bangkok all supported the continued independent existence of the Khmer Rouge regime.’[22]

Furthermore, the US’ military involvement in Asia ‘reinvigorated the antiwar movement and, of more significance, laid the groundwork for the subsequent impeachment proceedings against Nixon.’[23] Even the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, indirectly supported Cambodia by endorsing Chinese involvement in the region.[24] Arguably, the US acted through China because the latter did not face the government pressures that Western democracies did.[25] As Lapidus phrases it, there was ‘justifiable discomfort’ in the US’ support of the Khmer Rouge.[26] It is arguable, therefore, that the US’ response to the genocide was partly influenced by their democratic values, but these values were not enough to challenge the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal acts during the Cold War.

Overall, it has been shown that the Cold War motivated military involvement, preceding and succeeding Pol Pot seizing power. Thus, influencing the international response to the Cambodian genocide. This has been established through: US failure in Vietnam, US aggression that prompted the rise of the Khmer Rouge, anti-war movements in the US, and Chinese and US financial aid that enabled Pol Pot’s hostility towards neighbouring states. Military intervention in Southeast Asia, initiated to prevent a communist domino-effect, was a key factor that influenced the international response to the Cambodian genocide.

Discussing the Genocide Convention and its mandate is crucial for understanding how the Cold War influenced the international response to the Cambodian genocide. When the convention was created (1948), it was extremely controversial as there was widespread concern over the ‘scope and efficacy of the international treaty’.[27] It caused backlash from a variety of states, particularly the USA and USSR. Essentially, the act was politicised by both sides of the Cold War.[28] Weiss-Wendt draws on the importance of the convention, and how particular states responded to it. Specifically, the USSR opposed ‘the inclusion of political groups alongside national, ethnic, racial or religious groups as targets of genocide.’[29] This was because the USSR feared that the convention would challenge their history of repressive policies in Eastern Europe and under Stalin, and also their treatment of forced labourers in Gulags.[30] Similarly, the USA arguably delayed ratifying the Genocide Convention because of their internal battle with race relations.[31]‘Their historical and contemporary practices of racial discrimination and violence’ against African Americans became juxtaposed with their worldwide commitment to liberal values, specifically human rights.[32] Taking into consideration the debates of the USSR and USA, it is clear that the international response to the Cambodian genocide was influenced by the Genocide Convention, as both sides were battling with their own internal genocidal concerns. After all, it was only in November 1988 – forty years after it was finalised – that the USA ratified the Genocide Convention.[33] Meanwhile, ‘the unexpected Soviet ratification of the Genocide Convention in 1954 was also a Cold War maneuver.’[34]

The US government experienced a nationwide campaign to obligate them to commit ‘more vigorously to international humanitarian law.’[35] Nonetheless, the USA was unable to commit themselves to confronting and honouring human rights in their own country. Furthermore, during the debate about ratifying the convention, the political and military escalation in Vietnam and neighbouring countries including Cambodia was ongoing. The US’ policy of humanitarian intervention and confronting international communism was directly contradicting the ‘morality and ethical values on which America had been built.’[36] The statement has since been raised by Weiss-Wendt, when stating that ‘if the charge of genocide against Americans in Vietnam was preposterous, then so was one against Vietnamese in Cambodia.’[37] It is plausible that this relates to the UN’s role during the Cold War, which was primarily focused on inter-state conflicts. Cambodia was a matter of intra-state affairs; therefore, action was unlikely to happen because of state sovereignty.

This section of the essay has asserted that the Genocide Convention impacted the international response to the Cambodian genocide through the question of sovereignty and international humanitarian agreements.Nevertheless, the Genocide Convention itself was influenced by the Cold War powers in that ‘their historical actions and contemporary behaviour could not be deemed genocidal.’[38] This ultimately influenced international responses to the Cambodian genocide by highlighting the USA and USSR’s own shortcomings in civil rights protection.

Assessing the legal responses to the Cambodian genocide enables this essay to fully explore how the Cold War influenced the international reaction to the atrocity. Lapidus argued in 1998 that ‘the Khmer Rouge has not atoned for the genocide committed from 1975 to 1978. For justice to be served, Pol Pot and the others who orchestrated the deaths of millions would have to be genuinely tried and punished.’[39] Somehow, it was almost forty years after the genocide took place that some of the perpetrators were officially found guilty. However, not even Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, was ever tried and charged with any of the indictments of the Genocide Convention. Even before his timely death in 1998, it was agreed that Pol Pot was unlikely to suffer any significant punishments for his murderous actions.[40] For nearly forty years, former Khmer Rouge leaders, responsible for the deaths of around 1.7 million people, managed to evade justice.[41]

The end of the Cold War marked considerable change in the international legal response to the genocide. It is no coincidence that when the Soviet Union collapsed, ‘the genocide had finally been acknowledged in an official international forum.’[42] Prior to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, ‘China, the United States, and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), all supported Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in various ways, and opposed attempts to bring them to justice.’[43] The end of the Cold War also meant that Cambodia had a diminished strategic importance to the US.[44] However the USA, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, dominated the global stage and returned to championing liberal values, such as human rights, without fear of Soviet communism. It is arguable that the end of the Cold War enabled the US to drastically influence the UN and international legal responses, allowing justice to be brought to Cambodia. In other words, as Kiernan phrases it, when the U.S. Congress passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act in 1994, ‘it now became American policy to bring the perpetrators to justice.’[45] Internationally, it was recognised that ‘the Khmer Rouge regime had committed not only war crimes and crimes against humanity, but also genocide and other violations of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.’[46] In 1997, when the Tribunal was formalised, it was backed by four of five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council - Russia, France, Britain and the USA but not China.[47]

Ultimately, when the Cold War ended, legal responses - including creating a Tribunal and formal charges against Khmer Rouge leaders - came into effect. Through this, legal responses are evidence of the Cold War’s influence on international responses to the Cambodian genocide, as only when the Soviet Union collapsed was there formal international condemnation of the genocide in Cambodia.

In conclusion, this essay has sought to establish the ‘sociohistorical matrix’ of events that established the Cold War’s influence on the international response to the Cambodian genocide.[48] Exploring US military involvement in Vietnam and Western democratic pressures, this essay has shown that the US’ attitude towards the Cambodian genocide was heavily influenced by previous regional failures. Kiernan noted that both sides in the Vietnam conflict treated Cambodia as a theatre of their ground and air war - hence, the US’ reluctance to respond to the Cambodian genocide.[49] Additionally, the aid provided by China and the USA to support the Khmer Rouge, fuelled armed resistance towards Soviet-supported Vietnamese communists.[50]Furthermore, this essay has explored how the Khmer Rouge Tribunal was ‘a product of an international human rights ideology born out of the genocide and wide-scale human rights atrocities of World War II.’[51]The Genocide Convention itself was extensively influenced by the global hegemons. Thus, so was the response to genocide itself. The purpose of seeking international justice through the Khmer Rouge Tribunal was to provide ‘some level of justice and even reconciliation to Cambodians who suffered and lost their family members’ to the genocide.[52] Although it took nearly forty years, some degree of justice has been achieved. Through discussing military involvement, the Genocide Convention and legal responses, this essay has shown the numerous and complex ways in which the Cold War influenced the international response to the Cambodian genocide.

[1] Mark Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (1999), p. 539. [2] Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979’, in Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, ed. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (London, 2009), p. 322. [3] Henri Locard, ‘The Myth of Angkor as an Essential Component of the Khmer Rouge Utopia’ in Cultural Heritage as Civilizing Mission: From Decay to Recovery, ed. Michael Falser (New York, 2015), p. 202. [4] Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide’, in Century of Genocide (London, 2009), p. 319. [5] gsp.yale.edu/case-studies/cambodian-genocide-program, accessed 06 April, 2020. [6] www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf, accessed 06 April, 2020. The convention was released 9 December 1948 and was endorsed by Cambodia on 14 October 1950. United Nations, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. General Assembly Resolution 160 A (III), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Paris, 9 Dec. 1948). [7] Stephen P. Marks, ‘Elusive Justice for the Victims of the Khmer Rouge’, Journal of International Affairs 52, no. 2 (1999), p. 692. [8] Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos in the Vietnam War’, in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, ed. David L. Anderson (New York, 2011), p. 357. [9] Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos’ (New York, 2011), p. 360. [10] George C. Herring, ‘America and Vietnam: The Unending War’, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991), p. 109. [11] Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos’ (New York, 2011), p. 361. [12] ‘The Ho Chi Minh Trail’, Economic and Political Weekly 10, no.14 (1975), p. 564; Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos’ (New York, 2011), p. 364. [13] William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa Monica, 2001), p. 16. [14] Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos’ (New York, 2011), p. 362. [15] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002’, Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (2002), p. 484. See also: ‘The Ho Chi Minh Trail’, Economic and Political Weekly (1975), p. 564; Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos’ (New York, 2011), p. 361; Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Baltimore, 1983), p. 211. [16] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 484. [17] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 485. [18] David Lapidus, ‘The Lesser Evil: Rethinking the Khmer Rouge’, Harvard International Review 20, no. 1 (1997), p. 30. [19] Zachary Abuza, ‘The Khmer Rouge Quest for Economic Independence’, Asian Survey 33, no. 10 (1993), p. 1010. [20] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 487. [21] Zachary Abuza, ‘The Khmer Rouge Quest’, Asian Survey (1993), p. 1010. [22] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 487. [23] Kenton Clymer, ‘Cambodia and Laos’ (New York, 2011), p. 373. [24] Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide’, in Century of Genocide (London, 2009), p. 328. [25] Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide’, in Century of Genocide (London, 2009), p. 330. [26] David Lapidus, ‘The Lesser Evil’, Harvard International Review (1997), p. 31. [27] Amy E. Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt: The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide Convention’, The American Historical Review 124, no. 2 (2019), p. 633. [28] Amy Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt’, The American Historical Review (2019), p. 633. [29] Amy Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt’, The American Historical Review (2019), p. 633. [30] Amy Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt’, The American Historical Review (2019), p. 633. [31] Weiss-Wendt, p. 89. [32] Amy Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt’, The American Historical Review (2019), p. 633. [33] treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en , accessed 06 April, 2020. [34] Amy Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt’, The American Historical Review (2019), p. 633. [35] Anton Weiss-Wendt, A Rhetorical Crime: Genocide in the Geopolitical Discourse of the Cold War (London, 2018), p. 88. [36] Anton Weiss-Wendt, A Rhetorical Crime (London, 2018), p. 97. [37] Anton Weiss-Wendt, A Rhetorical Crime (London, 2018), p. 92. [38] Amy Randall, ‘Anton Weiss-Wendt’, The American Historical Review (2019), p. 634. [39] David Lapidus, ‘The Lesser Evil’, Harvard International Review (1997), p. 31. [40] David Lapidus, ‘The Lesser Evil’, Harvard International Review (1997), p. 31. [41] Eve Monique Zucker, ‘Trauma and Its Aftermath: Local Configurations of Reconciliation in Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal’, The Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 4 (2013), pp 793-796. [42] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 490. [43] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 488. [44] David Lapidus, ‘The Lesser Evil’, Harvard International Review (1997), p. 32. [45] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 490. [46] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 491. [47] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 491. [48] Eve M. Zucker, ‘Trauma and Its Aftermath’, The Journal of Asian Studies (2013), p. 797. [49] Ben Kiernan, ‘Introduction’, Critical Asian Studies (2002), p. 485. [50] Zachary Abuza, ‘The Khmer Rouge Quest’, Asian Survey (1993), p. 1010. [51] Eve M. Zucker, ‘Trauma and Its Aftermath’, The Journal of Asian Studies (2013), p. 798. [52] Eve M. Zucker, ‘Trauma and Its Aftermath’, The Journal of Asian Studies (2013), p. 796.

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